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I INTRODUCTION 
Ahakoa te momo mate, whakanuia tangata
1 
A The Central Dilemma 
The scene can be set by drawing on first, the statement of the dilemma, as the 
drafters of the Mental Health Bill in 1987 saw the issue: 
"In what circumstances should a civilized society insist on treating a mentally disordered 
citizen who is incapable of giving consent, or worse still, is capable of giving consent but 
refuses to do so?"2 
The wide statement of the right in section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (the Bo RA) suggests the retort to the second question is a clear "never!" 
"11. Right to refuse to undergo medical treatment-
Everyone has the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment". 
But enter section 5 of the Bo RA in the character of "justification", and the scene 
is set: 
"5. Justified limitations -
Subject to section 4 of the Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in 
this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". 
1 Ministry of Health Te Rau Hinengaro: The New Zealand Mental Health Survey: Summary. Wellington 
2006. The WhakataukT translates as "regardless of illness or disease, people deserve dignity and respect 
and the opportunity to become well again." 
2 Explanatory Note to the Mental Health Bill 1987 No. 18-1 
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A touch of suspense hangs in the air, as to what the effect of section 4 of the 
BoRA may be. If justification fails to make its case, will section 4 prevail or will it be 
re-empted? 
"4. Other enactments not affected -
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after the 
commencement of this Bill of Rights),-
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in 
any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment-
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights." 
B Thesis 
(i) This Paper examines the purpose of the right to refuse medical treatment. If it is 
correct that the purpose is to preserve human dignity and individual autonomy and, so 
that a person is not made the object of the actions of a heath-care provider, then the right 
should not be limited to "every person who is competent", but must have wider scope. 
(ii) Limitations on the right must be only such as meet the standard of section 5 of the 
BoRA, as that test was set out in Hansen's case.
3 
(iii) The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (the MH 
(CAT) Act) limits the right to refuse of those who are found to be "mentally disordered". 
(iv) The Court of Appeal in the Waitemata Health case defined the test for whether a 
person is "fit to be released from compulsory status" in terms of whether a person is 
"mentally disordered".4 The Court ruled that "mentally disordered" is the only test 
provided in the Act for exit from compulsory treatment. 
3 R v Hansen [2007) 3 NZLR I . 
4 Waitemata Health v Attorney-Genera/ (2001) 21 FRNZ 216. 
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(v) One study, cited by the Mental Health Commission, has found that New Zealand has 
a high rate of community compulsory treatment compared to a range of other countries 
surveyed. 5 It is suggested that this would not be the case if the right to refuse treatment 
was given effect on a basis which recognised a person's decisional capacity. 
C General Purposes of the BoRA and the MH (CAT) Act 
The Long Title to the BoRA places it in the role of safeguarding the rights of the 
individual; its task being: 
"(a) to affirm, protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New 
Zealand; and 
(b) to affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights". 
The BoRA is, in some senses, an ordinary statute, in that it was enacted as an 
ordinary act of Parliament. It does not give the courts power to strike down an enactment 
which breaches it, nor does it even give an explicit power to declare an enactment to be 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. At the same time, it is recognised as being part of 
New Zealand's constitutional canon.6 One of the reasons is on account of section 6, the 
final voice to speak: 
"6. Interpretation consistent with Bill of Rights to be preferred -
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other 
meaning." 
The Courts have recognised that the BoRA is to make a difference to the way in 
5 S Lawton-Smith A Question of Numbers: The Potential Impact of Community-based Treatment Orders in 
England and Wales (King's Fund, London, 2005), cited by the Mental Health Commission in No-Force 
Advocacy by Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (Wellington, November 2005), 9. 
6 Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003). 
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which other enactments are interpreted. 7 In the case of the MH (CAT) Act, if an analysis 
of the constraints on the right to refuse psychiatric treatment finds that the limits are not 
justified by the natural meaning, the next step is to seek another possible meaning which 
is consistent with the right to refuse treatment. 8 
One of the reasons why the BoRA is of constitutional status is that it is a statute 
which has as its purpose, the protection of individual and civil liberties against the power 
of the State. The BoRA applies to the acts of the 3 branches of government and to those 
carrying out statutory duties. 9 Many of the rights take the form of statements ofrights to 
be enjoyed by "everyone", as for example, section 11. However, the Supreme Court in 
Hansen's case has stated the rights in terms of justified rights. 10 
The MH (CAT) Act sets out some specific rights for patients in Part 6. 11 Section 
57 also provides that a patient may refuse consent to treatment, except as specified. The 
Act sets out procedures to be followed before compulsory treatment can be imposed, that 
is, it provides for protection by way of due process. 12 However the Act is also concerned 
to strike a balance in protecting individuals and the public from the dangers and 
inconvenience which people suffering from mental disorder can pose. 13 The MH (CAT) 
Act has procedures to ensure patients receive care and treatment. 14 The Act sets up a 
presumption that mental health patients will be treated in the community. 15 
The MH (CAT) Act imposes compulsory treatment on those who are within the 
definition of "mentally disordered". 16 This appears to be a direct inconsistency with the 
right to refuse medical treatment provided by section 1 I of the BoRA. In R v Hansen the 
Supreme Court has provided guidance as to the way the courts in New Zealand are to 
7 Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA), 270. 
8 R v Hansen, above n 3. 
9 S 3 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
10 R v Hansen, above n 3. 
11 The rights of patients in Part 6 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 
include the right in section 66 to medical and other health treatment appropriate to the patient's condition. 
12 Parts I and 2 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
13 S 11 OA of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
14 S 28(4)(a) of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
15 For example section 28(2) and section 29(3) of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992. 
16 S 11(1) ofthe Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
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deal with such inconsistencies. 17 
II APPLYING A BORA ANALYSIS TO COMPULSORY TREATMENT UNDER 
THE MH (CAT) ACT 
A The Supreme Court Decision in Hansen 
In R v Hansen the Supreme Court set out the most authoritative guidance to date 
as to the approach the New Zealand courts are to take in applying the BoRA to other 
legislation. 18 The starting point is to ascertain, by applying normal interpretation rules 
including section 5(1) of the Interpretation Act 1999, the extent to which a person who is 
subject to the MH (CAT) Act has the right to refuse psychiatric treatment. 
If the provisions in the MH (CAT) Act are inconsistent with the right to refuse 
treatment, the next step in the analysis is to consider whether the apparent inconsistencies 
are justified in terms of section 5 of the BoRA. In Hansen 's case the Supreme Court 
developed and applied the test initially used by the Canadian Supreme Court in R v 
Oakes. 19 A key similarity between the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
BoRA is that both precede the rights with a justification clause allowing reasonable 
limits.20 Provided the limitations are justified then there is no breach of the BoRA. If the 
limitations are considered not justified under section 5, the response required bys 6 is to 
seek an alternative consistent meaning. If no consistent meaning can be found , the 
justified meaning must be applied under section 4. 
Jn Hansen 's case McGrath J found it useful, by way of background, to consider 
17 R v Hansen, above n 3. 
18 R v Hansen, above n 3. 
19 R v Oakes ( 1986) 26 DLR ( 4 th ) 200 (SCC). 
2° Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Part I , Canadian Charter of Ri ghts and Freedoms, section I. 
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the importance of the right, setting out the purpose and also the scope of the right. 21 A 
discussion of the purpose and scope of the right follows. 
B Purpose of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment 
1 History of the right to refuse medical treatment 
To uncover the purpose of the right, it is useful to look at the antecedents which 
give background to the choice of wording for section 11. This includes ascertaining any 
limits on the right and how the right may interact with other rights. 
(a) White Paper on the draft Bill of Rights for New Zealand22 
The White Paper on the Draft Bill of Rights for New Zealand noted that the 
proposed section 11 had no direct equivalent in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).23 Paul Rishworth notes that sections 9, I O and 11 were grouped 
together in the original draft Bill which would have linked section 11 to Article 7 of the 
ICCPR which is the right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman treatment. 
24 
Sections 9, I O and 11 were separated out in the version which became the BoRA. 
Rishworth comments that section 11 is typically conceived as a protection for liberty and 
security of the person, which links to Article 9(1) of the ICCPR.
25 
Rishworth makes the point that although there are protections for patients in tort 
and criminal assault, and in the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' 
Rights, placing the right to refuse treatment in the BoRA constitutionalises the right.
26 
Rishworth considers this should be significant because Bill of Rights issues should be 
given prominence in decision-making.27 
21 R v Hansen, above n 3 [ 193] to [ 199]. 
22 Ministry of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" [ 1984-1985] AJHR A6, I 0.166. 
23 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (I 9 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 . 
24 Paul Rishworth and others, above n 6. 
25 Paul Rish worth The New Zealand Bill of Rights, above n 6, 252. 
26 Paul Rishworth The New Zealand Bill of Righls, above n 6, 251. 
27 Paul Rishworth The New Zealand Bill of Rights, above n 6, ibid. 
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The White Paper states, section 11 " ... enacts a general principle that everyone 
has the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment."
28 
(b) Section 11 of the BoRA and the common law right 
Presumably the general principle referred to in the White Paper is the common 
law right of a person to control his or her own body. "Basically any intentional 
nonconsensual touching which is harmful or offensive to a person ' s reasonable sense of 
dignity is actionable.29 Normal day-to-day unavoidable contact will not be actionable, 
but this does not include medical procedures. Margaret Brazier and John Murphy in 
Street on Torts say "Any physical contact with a patient without his consent to that 
contact is prima facie a battery".30 Providing there is informed consent this will be a 
defence. 31 Street on Torts comment that the law's requirement for consent to treatment 
also recognizes and enforces the right to self-determination, to autonomy.
32 
The common law protects the right however unreasonable, foolish or risky the 
patient ' s decision may appear in the eyes of the medical profession or the community.
33 
For the freedom to be meaningful , people must have the right to make choices that accord 
with their own values, regardless of how unwise those choices may appear to others.
34 
The United States Courts have recognized that a patient ' s right to determine the 
course of his medical treatment was paramount to what might otherwise be the doctor ' s 
obligation to provide medical care.35 
The case law illustrates the limitations on the right to control ones own body. 
Emergency situations are an exception to the right,
36 necessity is another.
37 Two 
28 Ministry of Justice, above n 23, I 0.166 . 
29 Malette v Schulman ( 1990) 67 DLR ( 4th) 321 (Ont CA). 
30 Margaret Brazier and John Murphy Street on Torts (I 0th
 Editi on, Butterworths, London, 1999), 85 . 
31 Margaret Brazier, ibid . 
32 Margaret Brazier and John Murphy " Street on Torts" ( 10
th Edition, Butterworths, London, 1999), 85 . 
33 Malette v Schulman ( 1990) 67 DLR ( 4TH) 321 (Ont CA). 
34 Smith v Auckland Hospital Board[ 1965] NZLR 191 , Gresson J at 219. 
35 Rivers v Katz 504 NYS 2d 74 ( 1986), citing the case of Storar, 78 . 
36 Malette v Schulman ( 1990) 67 DLR ( 4TH) 321 (Ont CA). 
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limitations are expressed in the classic statement by Cardozo J that "Every human being 
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body";38 namely that the right might not apply to children, or to mental patients. A child 
can give consent, but refusal by a child can be overridden in the child's best interests.
39 
The court may also make an order in the best interests of an adult who is incapable of 
giving consent.
40 
It should be noted that the courts have been involved in developing the limitations 
on the right, and in overseeing the limitations. In F v West Berkshire Health Authority 
and another (Mental Health Act Commission intervening) the House of Lords ruled that it 
was lawful to operate on a patient who was incapable of consenting, but the operation had 
to be in the best interest of the patient, and commented that in practice a declaration 
should be obtained as to the patient's best interests.
41 
( c) A purpose of protecting dignity and autonomy 
Referring to the common law source of the right to refuse treatment, Paul 
Rishworth endorses the purpose of section 11 as being to protect the interest in bodily 
integrity.42 He also draws on the North American jurisprudence and argues that the right 
protects human dignity and autonomy in the making of decisions about treatment and 
· · · 43 mvestigat1on. 
There is support in New Zealand case law for the view that protection of human 
dignity and autonomy is the purpose for the right, including in the context of mental 
health. In Re K [mental health] Judge Inglis QC acknowledged the danger of a 
paternalistic approach which, in the guise of the patient's own good, denies the patient 's 
37 Re F ( a mental patient: sterilization [ 1990] 2 AC I . 
38 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital I 05 NE 92 ( 1914) 93, cited by Rish worth, above n 26, 251. 
39 Margaret Brazier and John Murphy Street on Torts ( I 0
th Edition, Butterworths, London, 1999), 86. 
40 Re CMC [ 1995] NZFLR 538 ; Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 (CA). 
41 F v West Berkshire Health Authority and another (Mental Health Act Commission intervening)[l 989] 2 
All ER 545, HL. 
42 Paul Rishworth, above n 6, 252. 
43 Paul Rishworth, ibid. 
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refusal and therefore her right to the dignity of self-determination.
44 
Butler and Butler consider that the purpose of sections 10 and 11 is to prevent a 
person from being made a non-consensual object of the actions of a scientist or health-
care provider.45 Their statement of the purpose is consistent with the location of the 
right as a security of the person right, and consistent with the wider purpose which runs 
through the Bill of Rights, of protecting the autonomy and dignity of the person. Butler 
and Butler's statement of the purpose usefully places the right in the healthcare context. 
( d) Purpose of the right to refuse in the context of the MH (CAT) Act 
On the basis that the purpose of section 11 is to protect the patient's human 
dignity, autonomy and right to self determination in the course of care and treatment, it 
may be asked whether the right is relevant in the MH (CAT) Act context where patients 
may lack the mental ability to exercise autonomy and any sense of self determination. 
In Secretary, Department of Health v JWB and SMB Brennan J emphasized the 
breadth of the law's protection, saying that it rests on the unique identity of each person 
which the law respects and will protect, and that this applies regardless of the person's 
age or mental state.46 
The right will always have a role in protecting the dignity of the patient, no matter 
how seriously mentally ill he or she may be. This important point is illustrated by the 
case law in the United States challenging the use of anti psychotic drugs on constitutional 
and due process grounds. In Rivers v Katz the court ruled that even involuntarily 
committed mental patients had the right to test the state's right to impose treatment.
47 
Jn the mental health context, in particular, the weak state of the patient's mind 
makes him or her vulnerable to coercion in treatment. To fulfil I the purpose of protecting 
44 Re K [mental health} 22 FRNZ 349,356. 
45 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis NZ 
Limited, Wellington, 2005), 257. 
46 Secretary, Department of Health v JWB and SMB (1992) 66 ALJR 300, Brennan J, 317 - 318. 
47 Rivers v Kat::,, above n 35. 
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the patient from being made an object, the right needs to be given the fullest scope 
possible. This calls for more judicial oversight of treatment decision-making processes 
under the MH (CAT) Act. 
lf the right is to be the pathway to recovery for the person suffering mental illness, 
the treatment provided must be directed to improving the patient's condition, if possible 
to the point where the patient is competent to determine their own course of treatment. 
The right to refuse, even if never exercised, gives the patient the sense of 
autonomy which is central to recovery. 
( e) Informational content to the right 
The right to make an informed and voluntary choice depends on having sufficient 
information to make an informed decision, and so supports an informational content to 
the purpose. Having information about the treatment proposed, its possible benefits, 
risks and side effects, tends to redress the power imbalance between the patient and 
medical professionals. It puts the patient on a more equal footing and so promotes the 
patient's sense of autonomy and dignity. 
In Wilkinson 's case the importance of access to information and the opportunity 
to challenge the basis of the medical professionals ' approach was recognized as important 
in protecting the patient's Convention right not to be subject to degrading treatment.
48 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the claimant was entitled to require the attendance of the 
doctors to give evidence and be cross examined on the medication being prescribed 
without the claimant's consent. 49 
C Scope of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment 
Having identified the purpose for the right as protecting the autonomy and dignity 
48 Regina (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority and others [200 I] EWCA Civ 1545. 
49 Regina (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority and others, ibid . 
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of the patient from arbitrary and overbearing actions by the health care provider, this 
informs the scope which should be given to the right. The scope is also determined by 
the text and relevant case law. 
1 Definitional limits 
In Re S Barker J stated the right as applying to "every person who is competent to 
consent", thereby reading down the scope of the right. 50 The same approach was taken 
by Inglis QC in Re K [mental health]. 51 This in not surprising considering that Cardozo's 
classic statement of the common law right is in terms of the right applying to those of 
sound mind.52 Rishworth cautions that the common law rules around competency have 
the potential to undermine the protection afforded by section 11.53 Rather than limiting 
the beneficiaries of the right, it is preferable to consider whether there are definitional 
limits to the right. 54 
In section 11 the definitional limits are better seen as being around refusal. The 
question being whether the patient has expressed a clear statement of will to which the 
law will give effect. Focusing on the nature of the refusal goes to the exercise of the right 
which is concerned with the person's decisional capacity. 
(a) Refusal and decisional capacity 
The American psychiatrist Meisel , 55 points to a distinction between decisional 
capacity and competence. "Decisional-capacity" is a functional and factual concept 
referring to a person's actual decision-making ability. Decisional-capacity also is in 
relation to a specific decision-type, and is time specific. Decisional capacity can vary 
so Re S [1992) I NZLR 363. 
51 Re K [mental health}, above n 44. 
52 Cardozo Jin Schloendorff 's case, above n 38 . 
53 Paul Rishworth The New Zealand Bill of Rights, above n 6, 258. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Meisel , "Making Mental Health Care Decisions: Informed consent and Involuntary Civil Commitment 
( 1983) I Behav Sci and Law, 73 at 80, referred to by Denys Court "Mental Disorder and Human Rights: 
The Importance of a Presumption of Competence" (1996) 8 AULR I , 5. 
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depending on the person's situation, mental illness, even fatigue. 56 
Competency, in contrast, is a legal concept involving a conclusion applied to a 
person who has been determined, in accordance with legal requirements, to lack 
decisional capacity. Labeling a person as incompetent for all purposes or indefinitely 
should be avoided because of the variability of decisional capacity. 
The relevance of the distinction to the right to refuse is that it suggests that as well 
as regular assessment of the patient's decisional capacity by health professionals in the 
course of treatment, the patient should have the opportunity to place evidence before a 
judicial body where he or she wishes to refuse treatment. A finding of incompetence by a 
judicial body should not prevent a further determination of the patient's competence 
where there is evidence of a change in the patient's condition or a different decision 
involved. 
In Rivers v Katz the court cited medical authority to the effect that many patients, 
despite their mental illness, are capable of making rational and knowledgeable decisions 
about their medication.57 The court ruled that the determination as to whether the patient 
lacked capacity was a uniquely judicial, not medical, function. 58 
Likewise the court in Re K [mental health] considered that it is for the Court to 
determine whether the patient is competent to refuse.59 
(b) The test for competence or decisional capacity 
Kennedy and Grubb phrase the question as being what factors does the law regard 
as important before attaching significance to an expression of will by the patient?
60 The 
content of the patient's decision has been a factor in some cases. That the patient refused 
56 Denys Court " Mental Disorder and Human Rights : The importance of a Presumption of Competence" 
(1996) 8 AULR I. 
57 Rivers v Katz, above n 35, 79. 
58 Rivers v Katz, above n 35, 75. 
59 Re K {mental health} above n 44,357 . 
60 Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb Medical law (3 ed, Butterworths, London, 2000), 597. 
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treatment appeared to be relevant to the finding of incompetence in Re K [mental 
health}.61 The status of the patient has been a factor, such as whether the person is a 
committed patient. This approach was criticized in the United States case Rivers v 
Katz.62 
Kennedy and Grubb make the point that any test which is not individual-
orientated undermines their identified purpose of the right, which is individual 
autonomy.63 Meisel and his colleagues have noted that there is no single right test for 
competency, and that in reality, judgments of competence reflect social considerations 
and societal biases.64 
The test currently applied by the courts is as stated in Re MB (Medical 
Treatment). 65 The test involves the ability to understand, retain and weigh in the balance 
information relevant to the decision, especially as to likely consequences of having or not 
having the treatment, and using the information in the process of coming to a decision.66 
The test is individual-orientated, focuses on the understanding and use of information, 
and supports the purpose of the right to refuse. 
2 "Ad hoe balancing" 
A right may potentially conflict with other rights including community and public 
rights, which may be the case with section 11. One way of achieving compatibility is to 
limit the scope of a right so the right is not so broad as to impinge upon and limit other 
rights.67 The expression "ad hoe balancing", used to describe this approach, has been 
attributed to Professor Hogg.68 
61 Re K [mental health}, above n 44. 
62 Rivers v Katz 504 NYS 2d 74 (I 986), above n 35. 
63 Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb Medical Law, above n 60, 598 . 
64 Ibid, 603 
65 Re MB (Medical Treatment) [I 997} 2 FLR ./26 (CA). 
66 Re K [mental health} above n 46. 
67 Re J (An infant): Band B v Director-General of Social Welfare [ 1996] NZLR 134, Gault J, 146. 
68 Paul Rishworth The New Zealand Bill of Rights, above n 6, 53. 
- 14 -
Under the BoRA, limiting the scope of the rights is done as part of the section 5 
justification. The limiting takes place in the particular context and should be only to the 
extent needed to allow competing rights to operate as appropriate. In the United States 
case Rivers v Katz this balancing was expressed as balancing the individual ' s liberty 
interest against the state ' s asserting compelling need on the facts of each case.69 
The right of a mental patient to refuse treatment may be justified to the extent 
needed to give effect to other competing rights. It is suggested that factors which would 
be relevant to an "ad hoe" balancing of the rights include the significance of the treatment 
decision, the degree of competence of the patient, and whether the person poses imminent 
danger to themselves, or to others. 
In the mental health context it could be suggested that the limiting of the right to 
refuse treatment has already been provided for in the MH (CAT) Act and that there is no 
further room for ad hoe balancing to give rights more or less scope. 
3 Other aspects of the right to refuse 
(a) Refusal to Undergo Treatment, Contrasted with a Requirement for Consent 
Section 11 of the BoRA is phrased in terms of a right to refuse. This is in contrast 
to section 10 under which consent is required for medical experimentation. 
Rishworth is one writer who doubts that anything should be read into the 
difference in wording between sections 10 and 11 . He considers that on a purposive 
interpretation section 11 embraces not just a right to refuse treatment but also a right not 
to be treated without informed consent. 70 
The right not to be treated without consent and the right to refuse may not always 
mean the same thing. Section 59(2) of the MH (CAT) Act provides an example in that 
69 Rivers v Katz, above n 35 , 75 . 
70 Paul Rishworth The New Zealand Bill of Rights, above n 6, 256 . 
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under paragraph (a) a person is not required to accept treatment unless the person has 
given informed consent, but in the alternative paragraph (b ), the patient must accept 
treatment prescribed by the Review Board's psychiatrist. At a conceptual level the right 
to refuse is foundational and provides the basis for genuine consent. 
(b) The test for consent or refusal 
The comment has also been made that there is a more stringent standard for 
refusal because it involves being able to assess and come to a contrary view on the 
information available. 71 
If this is so then it is suggested it arises from the authoritative nature of the power 
of the medical profession. The right to refuse treatment is intended to be a counter-
weight to the advantage which the professional doctor or scientist has over the patient or 
layperson. An informed choice resulting in informed consent is a stringent standard to 
meet, or should be. 
(c) To whose Acts does the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Apply? 
By section 3 the Bill of Rights is limited in its application to acts done by state 
health providers, and to private providers carrying out a public function under statute. 
Specifically, in the context of the MH Act, section 11 potentially applies to responsible 
clinicians, psychiatrists appointed by the Review Tribunal, the Review Tribunal, District 
inspectors, official visitors and the courts. 
( d) Medical Treatment 
The White Paper takes a broad view of what is covered by the word "medical" 
and says it should be used in a comprehensive sense, including psychiatric and 
71 Sylvia Bell and Warren J Brookbanks Mental Health Law in New Zealand (Brooker's Limited, 
Wellington, 2005) 12.7, 241 
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psychological treatment. 72 
One question 1s whether this includes the assessment phase? It would be 
surprising if the right does not include assessment because diagnosis, which is what the 
assessment is, is closely related to treatment. If assessment was not covered this would 
amount to a gap in the protection because assessment is the basis for classification as 
mentally disordered and for choice of treatment. The view has been expressed that as 
assessment is closely associated with treatment throughout the MH (CAT) Act, it should 
be considered covered by the right. 73 
E Natural Meaning of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992 and whether it is Consistent with section 11 of the BoRA 
1 Introduction 
Having considered the purpose and the scope of section 11 , the next step in the 
analysis required by Hansen 's case is to identify the ordinary meaning of the provisions 
of the MH (CAT) Act to determine whether they allow decision makers to give effect to a 
person's refusal to accept the psychiatric treatment prescribed.74 
lf the provisions of the MH (CAT) Act are found to be inconsistent with the right 
to refuse treatment, the next step is to consider whether the imposition of compulsory 
psychiatric treatment can be justified at each phase of the Act ' s process. If it can be there 
is no breach of the BoRA. If not justified, it may be that another meaning can be applied 
to the MH (CAT) Act. 
The MH (CAT) Act's provisions are considered around 6 phases in the Act; namely : 
• The assessment phase under Part 1 and s 58; 
• The making of a compulsory treatment order (CTO) under s 27(3); 
72 Ministry of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand, above n 22 . 
73 Ministry of Justice Advice to the Attorney-General dated 5 October 1998 on the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Amendment Bill 1998. 
14 R v Hansen, above n 3. 
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• The first month under a CTO and s 59(1 ); 
• A CTO of indefinite duration made under s 34(4); 
• On-going treatment under s 59(2); 
• Review under section 79 and appeal under section 83. 
The two key definitions in the MH (CAT) Act are first considered as to whether 
they exclude a person who has decisional capacity and refuses to undergo treatment, from 
the Act's compulsion. The two definitions are "mental disorder" and fit to be released 
from compulsory treatment". 75 
2 "Mentally disordered" 
At the various phases of the process of committal and treatment under a CTO, a 
person is entitled to be free from assessment and treatment if found to be not within the 
definition of "mentally disordered".76 
"Mental disorder" is defined in s 2 as: 
"mental disorder, in relation to any person, means an abnormal state of mind (whether 
of a continuous or an intermittent nature), characterised by delusions, or by disorders of 
mood or perception or volition or cognition, of such a degree that it-
( a) poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that person or of others; or 
(b) seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of himself or 
herself;-
and mentally disordered, in relation to any such person, has a corresponding meaning". 
The definition has two limbs with the first describing the patient's abnormal state 
75 S 2 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
76 Examples of instances where a patient may be released for the reason that he or she is not " mentally 
disordered" are sections I 0(3) (in relation to a proposed patient), 12(1 )(b )(i), 12(3), 123( 4), 27(1 ), 27(3) . 
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of mind, and the second limb setting out the consequences of the abnormal state of mind. 
Given the role of the definition in entry to and exit from compulsory psychiatric 
treatment in New Zealand, it is necessary to consider whether the definition would 
exclude those who have decisional capacity or are competent. 
Under the descriptive limb the abnormal state of mind may be continuous or 
intermittent, which allows the possibility that the patient may have decisional capacity at 
times. Under the second limb, which describes consequences, the abnormal state of mind 
has to pose a serious danger or seriously diminish the person's capacity for self-care. 
It is doubtful that a person with an abnormal state of mind posing the dangers 
identified in the second limb of the definition of mentally disordered, would be 
competent to make a decision to refuse treatment. It is likely that in the absence of 
medication the person's judgment would be impaired and they would lack decisional 
capacity. However, take for example a patient has been on medication for some time and 
is in partial recovery. 77 The patient is still likely to be within the definition of "mental 
disorder" because of their underlying condition, but could have decisional capacity, 
possibly sufficient to make decisions about his or her course of treatment. As Judge Inglis 
QC said in Re K [mental health}, it should not be assumed that they are not competent. 78 
The current definition of "mental disorder", on a natural meaning, potentially covers 
both patients who are decisionally capable and those who are not, and those who refuse 
and those who consent to treatment. 
This appears to be the view of the scheme of the MH (CAT) Act taken in Waitemata 
Health v Attorney General. 79 The Court of Appeal ruled that the only basis on which a 
person can be released from compulsory status is that they have ceased to be "mentally 
disordered" and as a consequence are "fit for release". 80 That this interpretation could 
77 This is given by Nigel Dunlop as the first example in his article "Compulsory Psychiatric Treatment and 
"Mental Disorder" [2006] NZLJ] 225, 226. 
78 Re K [mental health], above n 44,357. 
79 Waitemata Health v Attorney General, above n 4. 
80 Waitemata Health v Attorney General, above n 4, [93]. 
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be a prescription for never-ending compulsory treatment is noted by Nigel Dunlop. 81 
The conclusion is that the natural meaning of mentally disordered, which effectively 
determines coverage by the MH (CAT) Act, is not aligned with a right to refuse 
treatment. 
3 "Fit to be released from compulsory status" 
The term "fit to be released from compulsory status" is defined as follows: 
"fit to be released from compulsory status in relation to a patient, means no longer 
mentally disordered and fit to be released from the requirement of assessment and 
treatment under this Act". 
It should be noted that the term "mentally disordered", which has already been 
discussed, is a component of the definition of "fit to be released from compulsory status". 
The relationship between "mentally disordered" and "fit to be released" is open to a 
number of interpretations and these are set out by Tipping J in his judgment in the Court 
of Appeal, as that the patient is: 
• No longer mentally disordered and also fit to be released; 
• No longer mentally disordered and therefore fit to be released; 
• No longer mentally disordered or fit to be released. 82 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the second or consequential meaning was the 
correct one on a natural interpretation of the M H (CAT) Act. 83 
The Court rejected the first interpretation for the reason that it requires an 
additional judgment of "fitness" and that the MH (CAT) Act contains no criteria for 
81 Nigel Dunlop "Compulsory Psychiatric Treatment and "Mental Disorder", above n 77, 228. 
82 Waitemata Health v Attorney General, above n 4, [93]. 
82 Ibid, [117]. 
83 Ibid, [82]. 
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making such an assessment. 84 
Waitemata Health was one of the parties which argued for the third or disjunctive 
meaning which is based on reading "and" as allowing "or".85 The Health Board's 
argument included the therapeutic and other advantages of the practice of allowing 
discharge of patients who come within the definition of "mentally disordered" but who 
are clinically assessed as being able to be treated or managed without a compulsory 
treatment order.86 The interpretation is also taken by the Guidelines issued by the 
Director-General under section 130 of the MH (CAT) Act. 87 
The Court of Appeal considered that it would be overstepping legitimate 
interpretation to allow discharge from compulsory status where the person remains 
mentally disordered but the clinician is of the view that the danger inherent in the mental 
disorder can be contained by a voluntary rather than compulsory regime. 88 The Chief 
Justice noted that the Act contains no guidance as to the criteria for "fitness" as a ground 
for release or detention, and that the scheme of the MH (CAT) Act is that those 
disordered to the extent that they are still within the definition of "mentally disordered" 
remain subject to compulsory status. 89 
At this point, it should be noted that the interpretation which gives the word "and" 
a consequential meaning, and which the Court of Appeal considered to be the natural 
meaning, does not allow for release from compulsory status on the basis that the patient 
has decisional capacity and refuses treatment. 
4 Phases of the MH (CAT) Act 
84 Ibid, [81 ]. 
85 Ibid, [82]. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ministry of Health "Guidelines to the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
1992", Wellington, 1 April 2000. 
88 Waitemata Health v Attorney General, above n 4, [93]. 
89 Waitemata Health v Attorney General, above n 4, [94]. 
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(a) Compulsory Treatment during the Part 1 Assessment Phase - the Natural 
Meaning and consistency with s 11 
The main provision imposing treatment during the assessment phase is section 58. 
It is as follows: 
"58 Treatment while undergoing assessment 
Every patient who is undergoing assessment pursuant to section 11 or section 13 of this 
Act shall be required to accept such treatment for mental disorder as the responsible 
clinician shall direct." 
The medical practitioner making the necessary assessment of the patient must 
determine whether in terms of s lO(l)(b)(ii)-
"there are reasonable grounds for believing that the proposed patient 1s mentally 
disordered and that it is desirable that the proposed patient be required to undergo further 
assessment and treatment." 
"Mentally disordered" is defined in section 2 and has been set out above. 
There is an argument that the words "and that it is desirable" add a further 
element to the criteria for compulsory assessment and treatment. However in the face of 
the clear words of section 58 and section 11 (1) which obliges the medical practitioner to 
require the patient to undergo further assessment and treatment, these words express the 
consequence of the finding of reasonable grounds that the patient is "mentally 
disordered". The natural meaning is that there is no allowance for a patient, even one who 
shows decisional capacity, to refuse treatment at this stage. 
The other aspect of the Part I process which should be considered is that the 
patient, and those who have concerns for him or her, may, under sections 11 (7) and 
12(12) apply to the district court to have the patient's condition reviewed under section 
16. This review requires a Judge to visit the patient and discuss with the patient, his or 
her views on the proposed course of assessment and treatment. Again, in the face of 
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section 58, even if the court considered that the patient had decisional capacity, and 
refused treatment, release from compulsory treatment is not a possibility. 
Indeed the only basis for release of a patient from the Part I process is that he or 
she is not "mentally disordered", or is "fit to be released from compulsory status", as 
these terms are defined in section 2. 
The conclusion is that patients in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds 
for a finding of "mentally disordered" are required to undergo treatment during the 
assessment and treatment phase under Part I of the Act, and so the natural meaning is not 
consistent with the right to refuse treatment. 
(b) Compulsory treatment order- natural meaning and consistency 
The provision under which a community treatment order is made is section 27 
which provides: 
"27 Court to consider patient's condition 
(1) On an application for a compulsory treatment order, the court shall determine whether 
or not the patient is mentally disordered. 
(2) If the Court considers that the patient is not mentally disordered, it shall order that the 
patient be released from compulsory treatment forthwith. 
(3) If the Court considers that the patient is mentally disordered, it shall determine 
whether or not, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is necessary to make 
a compulsory treatment order." 
Prior to the hearing, the judge is required , as was the case for a section 16 review, 
to visit the patient and discuss the patient ' s views on the proposed course of treatment. 
At this point in the process the Court has the opportunity and the informational basis to 
take into account the patient's decisional capacity with regard to treatment. It would 
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seem that on a natural meaning, even though a patient is "mentally disordered", if he or 
she has decisional capacity and is prepared to consent to treatment, it is not, in all the 
circumstances, necessary to make a CTO. 
However, if the patient has decisional capacity, comes within the definition of 
"mentally disordered" and refuses treatment, the discretion would not, on a natural 
meaning, extend to not making a CTO because this would mean the patient would not be 
treated. 
The conclusion is that on its natural meaning, the making of a CTO is inconsistent 
with the section 11 right, and so the next step will be whether the limitation on the right is 
ajustified one. 
(c) Compulsory treatment for the first month under a CTO - natural meaning and 
consistency 
Section 59(1) is as follows: 
"59 Treatment while subject to compulsory treatment order 
(l)Every patient who is subject to a compulsory treatment order shall, during the first 
month of the currency of the order, be required to accept such treatment for mental 
disorder as the responsible clinician shall direct". 
An aspect to notice about a CTO is that the statutory preference is that the order is 
for treatment as an outpatient under a community treatment order. The Court is to make 
an inpatient order only if the patient cannot be adequately treated in the community.90 
Section 59(1) does not appear on a natural interpretation, open to meaning that a 
responsible clinician has a discretion not to direct treatment if the patient refuses. The 
word shall is used both in relation to the patient accepting treatment and the responsible 
clinician directing. If there was no acceptable treatment for the patient's mental 
90 Section 28(2) of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
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condition, that would be a circumstance in which the clinician could not prescribe, but 
apart from such circumstances, the requirement is to treat and to accept. 
The conclusion is that the natural meaning is that there is no basis on which a 
competent patient could exercise the section 11 of the BoRA right to refuse treatment for 
the first month of a CTO. 
(d) Compulsory Treatment Order of indefinite duration - natural meaning and 
consistency 
On the third extension of a CTO, that is, after 18 months, the CTO becomes 
indefinite in duration. The wording of section 34( 4) is: 
"( 4) If. ... the Court then further extends the order, the patient shall remain subject to the 
order unless and until he or she is released from compulsory status." 
Treatment is not compulsory after the first month and further compulsory 
treatment must be authorised under section 59(2) or section 60. 
Release from compulsory status, whether by decision of the responsible clinician 
under section 35, the Review Tribunal under section 79 or the District Court is on the 
basis that the patient is "fit to be released from compulsory status" . 
The conclusion is that the natural mearung of indefinite CTOs with release 
effectively only on the basis that the person is no longer "mentally disordered", means 
on-going compulsory detention of patients who are decisionally capable, and is not 
consistent with the right to refuse treatment. 
(e) Compulsory treatment under section 59(2), and treatment under sections 60 and 
61 - natural meaning and consistency 
Section 59(2) and ( 4) provide: 
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"(2) Except during the period of 1 month referred to in subsection ( 1) of this section, no 
patient shall be required to accept any treatment unJess-
(a)The patient, having had the treatment explained to him or her m accordance with 
section 67 of this Act, consents in writing to the treatment; or 
(b )The treatment is considered to be in the interests of the patient by a psychiatrist (not 
being the responsible clinician) who has been appointed for the purposes of this section 
by the Review Tribunal ... 
(4)The responsible clinician shall, wherever practicable, seek to obtain the consent of the 
patient to any treatment even though that treatment may be authorised by or under this 
Act without the patient's consent". 
After the first month subject to a CTO there are a number of possibilities. One is 
that the patient remains subject to a CTO, but is not required to undergo further 
treatment. 91 A second possibility is that the person is considered "fit to be released from 
compulsory status" and is released. 92 
Another possibility is further treatment under section 59(2). This prov1s10n 
appears to align with the right to refuse treatment because of the opportunity given by 
section 59(2)(a) for the patient to give informed consent to treatment, and subsection (4) 
which requires the responsible clinician to seek consent to treatment, even though 
treatment can be imposed without consent. 
However, take a case where the patient initially gives consent under section 
59(2)(a), but then withdraws it under section 63. On the wording of section 59(2) the 
health care providers are not constrained by the withdrawal of consent, but can proceed 
with treatment considered in the interest of the patient by the psychiatrist appointed by 
the Review Tribunal. The patient ' s refusal can be overridden: it was merely an 
opportunity for the patient to participate in decision-making, but legally a refusal is of no 
consequence at all. 
91 Section 59(2) of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
92 Section 35(1) of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
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In his paper Denys Court has pointed out that the words "wherever practicable" 
are a weakness in subsection (4).93 "Wherever practicable" is undefined so is open to 
excuse any exigency for not seeking the patient's consent, even administrative 
inconvenience. The only real justification for not seeking the patient's consent is that the 
patient lacked decisional capacity. Court makes the point that section 59 does not include 
an obligation to assess the patient's decisional capacity, and contends that a finding of 
decisional capacity must be required in order to validate a consent under section 
59(2)(a).94 
The Ministry of Health's Guidelines to the Mental Heath (Compulsory assessment 
and Treatment) Act 1992 state that "care should be taken to scrutinize whether the patient 
is competent to give informed consent to the proposed intervention."95 The Guidelines 
recognize the possibility of and need for decisional capacity for a consent under section 
59(2)(a). If there are reasonable grounds for believing that the patient is not competent 
to consent under s 59(2)(a), the Ministry's advice is for the responsible clinician to have 
the treatment authorised under section 59(2)(b ).96 Refusal by a patient who has the 
capacity to consent is not envisaged by either the Act or the Guidelines. 
In contrast to section 59(2), section 60 has no equivalent to section 59(4) 
requiring that the responsible clinician seek the patient's consent to treatment. Section 60 
allows electro-convulsive therapy if either the patient gives informed consent under (a), 
or, under (b), a psychiatrist appointed by the Review Tribunal considers the treatment to 
be in the interests of the patient. Decisional capacity is obviously relevant under (a) . 
Section 63 allows a patient to withdraw consent given under (a), but like section 59(2), 
section 60 does not recognize a right to refuse treatment. 
Section 61 sets out the pre-conditions for brain surgery to be performed on a 
patient and is consistent with the right to refuse treatment because surgery to the brain 
93 Denys Court " Mental Disorder and Human Rights : The Importance of a Presumption of Competence", 
above n 58, 11 . 
94 Court, ibid . 
95 Ministry of Health "Guidelines to the Mental Heath (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992", 
(Wellington, I April 2000) 2.1. 
96 Ministry of Health , above n 102. 
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cannot be performed without the free and informed consent of the patient. 
An aspect of sections 59(2)(b) and 60(b) which is inconsistent with the BoRA is 
that the psychiatrist appointed by the Review Tribunal may impose treatment which he or 
she considers is in the patient ' s interest. Neither the MH (CAT) Act nor the Ministry give 
any guidance as to how or what matters the patient is to take into account in deciding 
whether and what treatment is in the interests of the patient. 
The standard under sections 59(2)(b) and 60(b) is only the interests of the patient, 
rather than the common law standard of the patient ' s best interest. 97 However, there is 
nothing of consequence in the difference in wording as the standard is still directed at the 
patient' s not the care provider's interest. 
The terms of sections 59(2) and 60(b) are that the patient is required to accept 
such treatment as the psychiatrist considers is in the interest of the patient. Considering 
that the objectives of the MH (CAT) Act are directed at treatment of the patient as an 
outpatient, and ultimately getting the patient to a state where he or she is "fit to be 
released from compulsory status", these factors suggest a bias in favour of treatment. As 
a natural meaning it is inconsistent that the patient's refusal would be part of the patient ' s 
interest. 
(f) Review under section 79 and Appeal under section 83 - natural meaning and 
consistency 
Regular 6 monthly reviews of the patient's condition must be carried out under 
section 76 by the responsible clinician as long as the patient remains subject to a CTO. 
There is a right to have the responsible clinician ' s assessment reviewed under section 79 
by the Review Tribunal. 
The Tribunal is an administrative body and the hearing it is not a judicial one. The 
Tribunal ' s procedure is set out in the First Schedule to the MH Act. 
91 F v West Berkshire Health Authority and another {Mental Health et Commission intervening)above n 41 . 
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It has been suggested that the Review Tribunal lacks the statutory capacity to address 
Bill of Rights issues, such as a patient's right to refuse treatment.98 The wording and 
context of the Tribunal's jurisdiction under section 79 on a natural meaning supports that 
assessment. 
Section 79(1) provides that: 
"(a) the Review Tribunal may at any time . .. review the condition of any patient who is 
subject to a compulsory treatment order:" 
Under subsection (6) the Tribunal may refuse the application for review if the 
Tribunal has recently carried out a review and has no reason to believe the patient ' s 
condition has changed since then, and under subsection (7), the certificate of the 
Tribunal's finding is as to whether the patient is "fit to be released from compulsory 
status". Clause 4 of the First Schedule further indicates the focus of the review: 
"4 (1) A Review Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that it is necessary for the proper review 
of a patient's condition, request . . . a medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other report 
of the patient." 
The terms and context of review are directed at the mental health of the patient, and 
are not, on a natural meaning, consistent with recognising a patient's refusal to undergo 
treatment. 
From the Review Tribunal there is a right of appeal to the District Court under section 83 
of the MH (CAT) Act. The District Court's jurisdiction on appeal is set out under section 
83(2): 
"(2) On any such appeal, the Court shall review the patient ' s condition to determine 
whether or not the patient is fit to be released from compulsory status; and the provisions 
of section 16 shall apply, .... to any such appeal." 
98 Brookersonline Introduction to the Mental Health (Compu/so,y Treatment and Assessment) Act 1992 
MH Intro .03(3). 
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Although the Judge must meet with the patient and discuss his or her views on 
treatment, the review is directed to the question whether the patient is "fit to be released 
from compulsory status". Giving effect to a patient's wish to refuse treatment imposed 
by the psychiatrist appointed by the Review Tribunal is, on the natural meaning, outside 
the District Court's jurisdiction. 
The conclusion is that the natural meaning of the review and appeal provisions is 
not consistent with the right to refuse treatment. 
F JUSTIFICATION OF INCONSISTENCY 
Having identified the natural meaning of the relevant parts of the MH (CAT) Act, 
and concluded that they are not consistent with a right to refuse treatment, the third 
inquiry is whether the limitations imposed by the MH (CAT) Act on the right to refuse 
psychiatric treatment can be justified in terms of section 5 of the BoRA . This is the 
approach taken by the effective majority of McGrath J and Tipping J in the Supreme 
Court in R v Hansen. 99 Tipping J set out the test as follows: 100 
"(a) does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify 
curtailment of the right or freedom? 
(b) (i) is the limiting measure rationally connected with its purpose? 
(ii) does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than 1s 
reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose? 
(iii) is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?" 
1 A sufficiently important objective 
The Bill which became the MH (CAT) Act 1992 Act was introduced into the House 
on 8 December 1987, before the BoRA, but its passage was a long one and overlaps the 
99 R v Hansen, above n 3, [192]. 
100 R v Hansen, above n 3, [I 04]. 
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BoRA. In fact the MH Act came into force on 1 November 1992, after the BoRA. 101 In 
the first Reading the Hon. David Caygill stated that the major rethinking behind the Bill 
was to bring New Zealand's mental health legislation into line with overseas legislation, 
notably the United Kingdom, by reflecting current themes in psychiatry: 
• that psychiatric patients should be treated as much like other patients as possible; 
• that treatment should be in the least restrictive environment possible; 
• that patients' rights should be protected; and 
• that a multidisciplinary approach to treatment decision-making should apply. 
Through the Reading speeches there is reference to striking the balance between the 
rights of patients, those who manage them, and the wider society. In the Second Reading 
the Associate Minister of Health noted that important constraints had been placed on non-
consensual treatment but considered there were appropriate protections in place for 
patients. 
From a consideration of the background to the Bill, the objectives to be served by the 
measures imposing compulsory treatment appear to be, firstly to ensure that those who 
are "mentally disordered" have the experience of the benefit of treatment. A second 
objective is to treat the majority of "mentally disordered" people in the least restrictive 
environment. For most patients this means as outpatients under community treatment 
orders. 102 
The bipartisan support for the Bill in its stages through the House is a good 
indicator of the widespread perception of the importance attached to achieving the 
objectives of the legislation. 
The first objective has been expressed as limited in time, ceasing to be relevant 
for ongoing treatment. However, the second objective of enabling the patient to live in 
the community becomes relevant for on-going treatment. 
10 1 The New Zealand Bill of Rights A et 1990 came into force on 25 September 1990. 
102 Waitemata Health, above, n 3, [93} and [9./]. 
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2 A rational connection 
Mental disorder impairs the ability of a person to exercise rights, including the right 
to refuse to undergo medical treatment. 103 The benefit from treatment is that it enables 
the person to recover and reach a state where they are again have the capacity to exercise 
rights. 
Requiring people who are suffering from a mental disorder to undergo treatment in 
most cases directly ensures they experience treatment. In cases where the patient opposes 
treatment the first objective will not always be achieved, and indeed if the person 
physically resists treatment there must be questions around whether there will be any 
therapeutic benefit. An example is Wilkinson's case, 104 where the patient physically 
fought the administration of anti-psychotic drugs to an extent to raise concerns that he 
would suffer a heart attack. 
However the second objective may be relevant. Treatment may keep the patient in a 
stable condition, and enables them to live in the community. In the absence of a 
compulsory order some patients would not accept medication. 
Re S is an example of such a case. 105 S lived in his own home and was regularly 
visited by hospital personnel who administered medication to him. After awhile he 
indicated that he wanted to discontinue treatment. The evidence was that S lacked insight 
into his illness and did not appreciate the necessity to continue with medication in order 
103 This point was articulated by the advisers in the Ministry of Justice in the 5 October 1998 Briefing by 
Ministry of Justice to the Attorney-General: Compliance with the Bill of Rights Act 1990: Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Amendment Bill 
104 Regina (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority and others, above n 23. 
105 Re S, above n 50. 
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to control his paranoia which would otherwise bring him into conflict with his 
neighbours. 
(a) Compulsory treatment during the assessment phase and for the first month of a CTO 
Imposing compulsory treatment is likely to be particularly necessary in the early 
stages of mental health treatment because patients are often in a state such that they deny 
they are ill and need treatment. 
The result of imposing treatment is that the person suffering from mental disorder 
experiences the benefits of medication and has the opportunity to reflect on the 
contribution treatment makes to their quality of life. There is therefore a clear connection 
between the limit on the right to refuse and the stated objective. The treatment received 
during the assessment phase and for the first month under the CTO enables the patient in 
every other way to experience a normal life. 
There is a rational connection between the grounds for release from compulsory 
treatment during this time, which are that effectively the patient is not "mentally 
disordered", and the objectives. 
(b)' Compulsory treatment order under section 27(3) 
There is a rational connection between an order requiring a patient to submit to 
compulsory treatment, and ensuring that patients experience the benefits of treatment. 
Placing patients under a regime in which they must undergo regular treatment requires 
them to experience the difference on a sustained basis. A CTO can be either on an 
inpatient basis, which can be a temporary situation, until the patient is able to cope as an 
outpatient and the CTO then becomes placed under a Community Treatment Order, 
which is directly related to the second objective of living in the community. 
The rational connection between the grounds for release is as for the assessment and 
first month of treatment. 
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( c) A CTO of indefinite duration 
Indefinite compulsory status does not always have a rational connection with the first 
objective. The case of Re K [mental health}'06 illustrates that patients who have an 
experience of treatment do not always favour continuing treatment. Mrs K had been 
subject to a community treatment order for more than a year. Her responsible clinician 
sought an extension of the order but Mrs K opposed this. 
The judge's finding was that the mental disorder Mrs K was suffering from had 
affected her mental processes and she was unable to fully appreciate the contribution the 
treatment made to her wellbeing. Mrs K had experienced the benefits but argued that the 
CTO affected her right to self-determination. 
An order imposing continuing treatment was made in order to maintain Mrs K's 
stable condition and enable her to continue to be a well-respected and productive member 
of the community. There was a connection between the limitation on Mrs K ' s right to 
refuse, including continuing mental disorder and the second objective of enabling her to 
continue in the commW1ity. 
(d) On-going Treatment and sections 59(2) and 60(b) 
There is a rational connection between the limitation of compulsory on-going 
treatment and the second objective of enabling the patient to live in the community. 
Without the appropriate treatment the patient's abnormal state of mind poses the 
problematic consequences described in the second limb of the definition of "mentally 
disordered". 
(e) Review under section 79 and appeal under section 83 
Limiting the right to refuse by not making it enforceable through the review and 
106 Re K [mental health}, above n 44. 
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appeal procedure has a rational connection with the first objective in that the patient must 
undergo treatment through to the end of the first month of a CTO, unless not mentally 
disordered or fit to be released. There is no rational connection between limiting the right 
and enabling life in the community. 
3 Minimal impairment 
This formulation of the test as one of limiting the right no more than reasonably 
necessary to achieve the objectives was favoured by the effective majority of the 
members of the Supreme Court. Tipping and McGrath and Blanchard recognised that 
this formulation gives appropriate latitude to Parliament. 107 
The intention expressed by members of Parliament at the time the MH (CAT) Act 
was passed was that its application would be limited, through the gatekeeper definition, 
to those whom it is necessary to treat compulsorily and because their condition is 
serious. 108 Similarly in the Waitemata Health case the Chief Justice noted that the MH 
(CAT) Act applies only to those who it is necessary to assess or treat compulsorily and 
then only if their condition reaches a sufficient state of seriousness. 109 
The hope was also expressed by the members of Parliament that for the majority 
of patients, compulsory status would be short term. 110 The limitation was therefore 
intended to apply to small numbers of people, of whom few would be competent to refuse 
treatment. 111 
It was also intended to apply in the least intrusive way by allowing for treatment 
to be administered to the patient in their own home in the community. 
The Mental Health Commission and the Director of Mental Health agree that data 
101 Hansen v R, above n 3, [ 126]. The standard has at time been expressed in terms that the limit must 
impair the right as little as possible. 
108 Hon Katherine O'Regan ( 12 March 1992) NZPD 6860 . 
109 Waitemata Health v Attorney-General, above n 4, [67] . 
110 Hon D Caygill (8 December 1987) 485 NZPD 1381. 
111 Re S, above n 50, at 374; Barker J's comment that "Being mentally disordered and competent are not 
mutually exclusive, the presence of both factors simultaneously is no doubt uncommon." 
- 35 -
on the number of people subject to compulsory treatment is of poor quality. 112 The 
Commission has referred to one overseas study which found that the restriction impairs 
the right to refuse treatment for a larger group and for longer than it possibly needs. The 
study found that both the number of people subject to CTOs in New Zealand, and the 
length of time spent subject to CTOs was high by comparison with other comparable 
countries such as the United Kingdom. 113 
An estimate is that at any one time as many as 60 persons per 100,000 New 
Zealanders are subject to a CT0. 114 
(a) Compulsory treatment during the assessment phase and for the first month of a CTO 
This phase enables health professionals to commence treatment and make an 
assessment of the patient's current mental health. 
Safeguards against impairing the right more than is reasonably necessary during the 
assessment phase include short duration; the assessment and treatment phase can be a 
maximum of 78 days, and the right to apply for review of the patient's condition by the 
District Court under sections 11(7) and 12(12). The 78 day maximum period of 
compulsory treatment is reasonably necessary to achieve the objective of enabling the 
patient to experience the benefits of treatment. 
The conclusion is that the limit is no more than a minimal impairment. 
(b)' Compulsory treatment order under section 27(3) 
The making of a CTO appears to be a minimal impairment of the patient's right to 
refuse medical treatment because after the first month the status of the patient as subject 
to a CTO does not mean the patient must receive medication. The CTO can act as a 
112 Mental Health Commission "No-Force Advocacy by Users and Survivors of Psychiatry" Tina 
Minkowitz and Others", Wellington, 2005, 21. 
113 Lawton-Smith, above n 5. 
114 Office of the Director of Mental Health "Annual Report 2005", Wellington 2005, 23. 
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safety measure so that if treatment is needed to be administered involuntarily this can be 
done under the section 59(2) powers. 
There are protections for the patient in the CTO process in the high threshold of 
" ... whether or not, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is necessary to 
make a compulsory treatment order", but as noted earlier, this would not allow not 
making a CTO where a person refused treatment. 
The patient's responsible clinician may direct the release of a patient from 
compulsory status at any time where he or she considers the patient is "fit to be 
released".115 District inspectors have the power to refer the case of a patient to the 
Review Tribunal for a review of the patient's condition. 11 6 
In conclusion, a CTO of six months' duration is a minimal impairment of the right. 
(c) A CTO of indefinite duration 
The CTO becomes one of indefinite duration if the Court decides to extend 
compulsory status at the third judicial hearing at 18 months. This is a more than minimal 
impairment of the right to refuse treatment in that it ends regular judicial oversight of the 
treatment of the patient. The patient's consent can be obtained to treatment without a 
judicial assessment of his or her decisional capacity. A psychiatrist appointed by the 
Review Tribunal can make their own assessment of the patient's interest without judicial 
oversight. 
Under the natural meaning, a CTO could be made in respect of a patient who is only 
intermittently mentally abnormal and who in the past has committed a single serious 
assault. This seems a more than minimal impairment. 
( d) On-going Treatment and sections 59(2) and 60(b) 
11 5 S 35(1) of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
11 6 See section 76(9)(b) of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act I 992 . 
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The rationale that was adopted in both Re Sand Re K [mental health] was that 
mental illness continued to limit these patients ' insight into the benefits of medication 
and the effects of the illness. 11 7 The first objective of providing the patient with an 
opportunity to experience the benefits of compulsory treatment had been expended and 
had not been achieved because, after more than a year on medication, the patient refused 
treatment. 
In relation to the objective of enabling the patient to continue to live in the 
community, provided the patient is able to enjoy quality of life in their own home, the 
impairment of the right to refuse is arguably no more than is reasonabl y necessary. 118 
However, in Re Sand Re K [mental health], u 9 both patients considered the intrusion 
of treatment by hospital staff was more than they were prepared to tolerate. S was 
prepared to accept medication at a lower dosage which may mean he would be less stable 
and have more difficulties with neighbours. In Mrs K ' s case, she expressed a preference 
to rely on the power of faith ; a preference that was consistent with her values and beliefs. 
There would possibly be periods when she would need to be hospitalized . The test 
applied by the court as to competency appeared to be based on acceptable outcomes, and 
did not allow for individual preference to rely, wholly or partly, on other sources of 
support. 
The limitation on the right to refuse appears more than is reasonably necessary to 
achieve the objective of enabling patient ' s to live in the community. 
(e) Review under section 79 and appeal under section 83 
The constraint on the Review Tribunal ' s power on review, and of the Court ' s powers 
on appeal , of denying jurisdiction to give effect to a patient ' s refusal are further 
constraints on the right. 
11 7 Re S, above n 50; Re K [ mental health}, above n 44. 
118 Re Sand Re K [ mental health), ibid . 
11 9 Re Sand Re K [ mental health), ibid . 
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The limitation is more than is reasonably necessary to achieve the objective of 
enabling the patient to live and receive treatment in the community. 
4 Is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objectives? 
(a) Compulsory treatment during the assessment phase and for the first month of a CTO 
This period is of limited duration and allows the responsible clinician to find the 
medication best suited to the patient, and to ensure the patient experiences the benefits of 
the medication. The hope is that from a limited period of compulsory treatment, the 
outcome is that the patient comes to appreciate the benefits, and will be cured, or accept 
treatment on a voluntary basis, or be able to live in the community under a Community 
Treatment Order. 
With this in mind this initial period of compulsory treatment is proportionate to the 
importance of the objectives. 
(b)' Compulsory treatment order under section 27(3) 
An order is a proportionate limitation on the right to refuse, considering that the 
duration is 6 months, the patient is not necessarily subject to treatment for the entire time, 
the process for making a CTO involves the Judge meeting with the patient, and there is 
the high threshold for making the order in that it must in all the circumstances, be 
necessary. The objectives are in comparison much more substantial than the limits. 
A patient subject to an indefinite CTO is not necessarily required to take medication; 
they could be taking the medication willingly, so it could be suggested that the 
compulsory status is of small moment in terms of the right to refuse. However, it is 
disproportionately burdensome to leave a person subject to compulsory status as a back-
up measure. A psychiatrist appointed by the Review Tribunal can at any time make use 
of the power under section 59(2) on the grounds of the patient's interest. There is no 
direct judicial oversight of the patient once the CTO becomes indefinite. 
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The conclusion is that on a natural meaning the making of a CTO of indefinite 
duration is a disproportionate limitation on the right to refuse treatment. 
( d) On-going Treatment and sections 59(2) and 60(b) 
It is in this area of the Act's processes that there is the greatest cause for criticism in 
relation to the right to refuse treatment. This is because, as noted earlier, there is no prior 
finding of the patient's decisional capability by a judicial authority, and certain 
unsatisfactory aspects of the provision for review. 
In F v West Berkshire Health Authority and another (Mental Health act Commission 
intervening) the House of Lords ruled that there should be judicial oversight as to 
whether treatment was in the patient ' s best interest. 120 Although at common law a doctor 
could operate on a patient provided the operation was in the best interests of the patient, 
in practice the question as to whether a treatment was in the patient ' s best interest should 
be established by judicial process. The same criticism could be made of the minimal 
process provided by sections 59(2) and 60(b). 
The Review Tribunal ' s appointed psychiatrist can override an express refusal by a 
patient. Considering that the right has the purpose of protecting the patient ' s most 
important interests, their human dignity, autonomy and self-determination, the right 
should not be overridden without judicial determination that the patient lacks the 
necessary capacity to exercise it. 
The power given under sections 59(2)(b) and 60(b) is a more than disproportionate 
limit on the right to refuse. 
(e) Review under section 79 and appeal under section 83 
On a natural interpretation of these appeal rights, the rev iew Tribunal and the District 
12° F v West Berkshire Health Authority and another (Mental Health act Commission intervening), above n 
41. 
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Court are limited to considering the patient's clinical condition. This constraint affects 
the patient's right to refuse treatment. Up to the end of the first month of a CTO the 
limitation is not disproportionate so that the objectives can be achieved. 
On an on-going basis it is disproportionate to deny the right to have the Tribunal or 
Court enforce the right, considering the fundamental and constitutional nature of the 
right. It may be that the patient lacks the decisional capacity to exercise the right but 
before overriding it, there needs to be a judicial determination that the patient lacks the 
necessary capacity. 
5 Conclusions as to justification of limits on the right to refuse 
It should be remembered that the limit is to the patient's right to refuse psychiatric 
treatment. The purpose of the right is to uphold the patient's autonomy and dignity as a 
person. The scope of the right is every person to the full extent of their decisional 
capacity with respect to treatment. The objectives of the compulsory powers have been 
identified as being to ensure the patient experiences the contribution that treatment can 
make to their wellbeing, and to enable patients to live and receive treatment in the 
community. 
The areas where the limitations on the right were found to be unjustified are indefinite 
CTOs, compulsory treatment under sections 59(2)(b) 60(b), and the jurisdiction of 
Review Tribunals and the District Court in relation to the right to refuse treatment. 
C A Bill of Rights Consistent Interpretation 
The next step is to consider whether a BoRA rights consistent interpretation of those 
aspects of the MH (CAT) Act regime which have been identified as being unjustified, is 
possible. 
I Indefinite compulsory status 
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Nigel Dunlop argues that a section 11 of the BoRA-consistent interpretation is 
possible within the definition of "mental disorder", supported by justification under 
section 5. 121 He considers that the Court of Appeal in Waitemata Health does not prevent 
the release from compulsory status of patients who are able to consent and accept 
treatment in the community on a voluntary basis, and neither does it prevent the release 
of patients who refuse treatment. 122 The Chief Justice's statement was that release of 
patients who remain "mentally disordered" to a voluntary regime was not permitted by 
the Act. 123 This part of the decision needs to be read in the context of legislation that 
applies to patients who need to be treated compulsorily and whose condition is of a 
sufficient state of seriousness. 124 
Nigel Dunlop argues that the effect of the decision in Waitemata Health has correctly 
focused attention on the definition of "mental disorder" .125 His view is that a satisfactory 
basis for decisions to release from compulsory status, can be found in the two 
consequential limbs of the definition of "mentally disordered" . 126 A person who does 
not present a serious danger to themselves or others, and is capable of taking the 
prescribed medication voluntarily should be considered outside the "mentally disordered" 
definition. 
Likewise, the section 11 right of a patient who is found to have decisional capacity 
and chooses to refuse treatment, will be recognized provided the person is not "mentally 
disordered". A person will not be "mentally disordered" if the decision-maker, for 
example, the responsible clinician's, assessment is that the patient will exercise his or her 
decisional capacity so as to be outside the consequential limbs of the "mentally 
disordered" definition. In other words, the outcomes of the person's decisions are not 
going to cause serious danger to the health and safety of others, or to his or her capacity 
for self-care. 
12 1 Nigel Dunlop, above n 77, 232. 
122 Nigel Dunlop, ibid . 
123 Waitemala Health v Atlorney General, above n 4, [93] . 
124 Waitemata Health v Attorney General, above n 4, [67]. 
125 Nigel Dunlop, above n 77, 225 
126 Nigel Dunlop, above n 77, 232. 
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There is an argument that the matter cannot be entirely resolved on the section 6 basis 
of the definition because the definition of "mental disorder" is not a completely 
satisfactory test for decisional capacity. It is still possible that a person will have 
decisional capacity or be competent in terms of the Re MB test; a , 127 but in terms of the 
"mental disorder" definition, their abnormal state of mind is assessed as likely to mean 
the patient would be a serious danger to other people's safety. 
It sounds unlikely that a patient could be assessed in terms of the Re MB test of 
understanding, weighing and using information in the process of coming to a decision, 128 
as having decision capacity and come within the definition of "mental disorder" because 
of the assessed outcome from the use of her or her decisional capacity. In other words, 
the patient would lack decisional capacity because of being "mentally disordered." 
The definitional limit in refusal can resolve the apparent conflict and there 1s no 
breach of the BoRA by virtue of a section 6 consistent interpretation. 
2 Treatment in the patient 's interest under sections 59(2) or 60(b) 
"Interests of the patient" in sections 59(2) and 60(b) is not defined but a BoRA 
consistent interpretation is that the patient ' s interest includes an interest in a right which 
has as its purpose protecting his or her human dignity, autonomy and self-determination. 
A psychiatrist considering imposing treatment must take account of the patient's 
right to refuse treatment to the full extent possible. If there has been a finding that the 
patient lacks competence to decide the course of his or her treatment, the psychiatrist, 
must, in the patient ' s interest, treat the patient with the objective of restoring the patient's 
decisional capability. While it is possible for the psychiatrist to do this under the MH 
(CAT) Act, the requirement is not explicit, and needs to be. 
In F v West Berkshire Health Authority and another (Mental Health et 
Commission intervening) the House of Lords stated that treatment will be in the patient's 
127 Re MB (Medical Treatment), above n 65 . 
128 Ibid. 
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best interests only if it is carried out in order either to save their lives or to ensure 
improvement or prevent deterioration in their physical or mental health. 129 This 
interpretation should argued if a similar case arose in New Zealand. 
3 Review under section 79 and appeal under section 83 
The Review Tribunal's jurisdiction under section 79 is to review the condition of 
a patient who is subject to a CTO and decide whether he or she is "fit for release from 
compulsory status". The term patient's condition is not defined, but surely includes the 
medication or treatment they are receiving or that is proposed. Furthermore, the patient's 
condition in the wider sense includes the exercise of his or her BoRA rights. Earlier it 
was noted that the indications in section 79 and the First Schedule procedural provisions 
supported a natural meaning of patient's condition as being limited to the patient's 
medical condition, but a wider Bill of Rights consistent interpretation is possible. 
On appeal to the District Court, the Court is required to review the patient's 
condition. Again this is in regard to the patient's fitness for release, which relates to 
mental disorder. The additional basis for suggesting that the patient's condition includes 
the patient's rights is that section 83(2) requires the Judge to carry out the section 16 
steps of having a discussion with the patient on matters including treatment, so that a 
patient's wanting to refuse treatment is relevant. 
The conclusion is that a BoRA interpretation is possible to bring the patient's 
decisional capacity and attitude to treatment within the subject matter of the patient's 
condition. If the evidence is that the patient has decisional capacity and refuses treatment 
that would be a matter for the Review Tribunal or the Court to take into account. 
However, if the person's abnormal mental state is that they pose a danger to the health or 
safety of others, they are still within the definition of "mental disorder" and cannot be 
released from compulsory treatment. 
The conclusion is that a BoRA rights-consistent interpretation is possible to bring the 
129 F v West Berkshire Health Authority and another (Mental Health et Commission intervening), above n 
41,548. 
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patient's right to refuse treatment within the jurisdiction of Review Tribunals and the 
Court. It would be preferable if it were more explicit. 
III CONCLUSIONS 
(i) The purpose of the right to refuse medical treatment in section 11 of the BoRA is 
to safeguard human dignity, autonomy and self-determination, including that of people 
within the description "mentally disordered" under the MH (CAT) Act. The right is the 
basis for genuine consent and applies to everyone to the extent that they have decisional 
capacity to refuse treatment. 
(ii) Provided compulsory treatment is justified in terms of s 5 of the Bill of Rights 
there is no breach of the BoRA. Justification is largely provided by the MH (CAT) Act 
which imposes treatment for reasons of emergency, or on those who are within the 
definition of "mentally disordered". Compulsory treatment is justified for the initial 
period of assessment and treatment, and for the first month of a CTO. 
(iii) There is a sufficient degree of alignment between the definition of "mentally 
disordered" and the test for decisional capacity in Re MB for a consistent interpretation 
between the MH (CAT) Act and section 11 of the BoRA. 130 
(iii) A specific judicial determination should be required prior to treatment under 
sections 59(2)(a) or (b) and 60 of the MH (CAT) Act as to the patient's decisional 
capacity in relation to treatment. 
(iv) The patient's interest includes the exercise of his or her BoRA rights. A BoRA 
consistent interpretation of the MH (CAT) Act is that review of the patient's condition by 
either the Review Tribunal or the Court implicates BoRA rights. 
The cu11ain call is for section 6 which provided a consistent interpretation where 
130 Re MB, above n 65 . 
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the limitation on the right could not be justified in section 5 terms. 
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